

**PKU Summer School International
Online Instruction**

**THE RISE OF CHINA AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS
“中国崛起与世界政治变局” 专题研讨课**

~ Syllabus ~

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Peking University

Teaching Assistants
(TBA)

Virtual Classes:
Mon, Tue, Wed, Fri 9:00-12:00

Objective

The rise of China is one of the most important and defining themes in changing world politics. This seminar course is intended for students to examine major issues and topics concerning the rise of China from a broad theoretical perspective, and to engage in the academic discourse and policy debate about implications of China's rise for world politics. The seminar is organized around the central question – what kind of change will China's rise bring to the international system? – and roughly divided into three parts: (1) China's rise and the “paradigm change” in world politics; (2) China's quest for national identity and rejuvenation; and (3) impacts of China rising on world order. Under each of these sections, a few specific topics are identified for class discussion.

Students wishing to enroll in this course are expected to have basic knowledge of international relations and China's foreign policy.

Proceeding of the Course

Participation and discussion (including TA-led sections) constitute a central part in this course. Attendance is mandatory. Students are expected to complete all required readings prior to class meetings and to actively participate in class discussion. Absence without legitimate reasons will lead to deduction in scores for participation and discussion, and **3 unexcused absences** will lead to a student's failure in the course.

The proceeding of the course will be based on students' presentation of the required texts related to the general themes and specific topics. Throughout the course, each student is expected to write one or two short (1-page) memos which briefly critiques required texts and raises questions for a particular session. Memos and presentations will count toward scores in participation. The students who prepare memos should circulate the memos via the course public email before class, and each make a 5-minute presentation in class, which is followed by class discussion.

Students will take 4 quizzes mainly about readings and lectures; ***scores for 3 of the quizzes count toward the evaluation.***

Paper Assignment

Students are required to write one analytical paper (about 1,200-1,500 words, double-space and 12-point font) on a topic that is relevant for the central theme of this course. The paper should focus on

one or more specific issues/topics of this course, and may be related to your group project or fieldtrips.

Paper does not require research on primary sources, but it should be associated with the assigned texts and other relevant literature.

The paper is **due on Friday, August 7**. No late submission will be accepted unless a legitimate reason is presented to the instructor at least three days in advance. If you have any question concerning how to pick up a topic and/or how to write a paper, please consult with the instructor or TAs.

Evaluation

Five parts of the evaluation will be calculated as follows:

Attendance	Participation	Memo	Quizzes	Paper
20%	20%	10%	15%	35%

Texts

There are both *required* and *recommended* readings for each class. No book purchase needed. Yet you may read any of the following books as a background reading:

- Ezra F. Vogel. 2011. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge, MA and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Henry Kissinger. 2011. *On China*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Thomas J. Christensen. 2016. *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

All the required texts (those highlighted in **bold**) will be available and accessible through a course public email or other platforms, which will be available during the summer school.

Academic Integrity

Participation in this class commits the students and instructor to abide by a general norm of equal opportunity and academic integrity. It implies permission from students to submit their written work to services that check for plagiarism (such as Turnitin.com). It is your responsibility to familiarize yourself with the definition of plagiarism. Violations of the norm of academic integrity will be firmly dealt with in this class.

CLASS SCHEDULE (Subject to adjustment)

TA Section 1

- Introduction and warm-up
- Class housekeeping

Session 1

Introduction: Understanding the Rise of China

Memo Presentation I

China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.

Napoléon Bonaparte, 1803 (or 1817)

It is not possible to pretend that China is another player. This is the biggest player in the history of man.

Lee Kuan Yew, 1993

Outline:

- What is the rise of China all about?
- International *systemic* change and international *systems* change
- The purpose and scope of the course
- Course requirements
- Class and presentations scheduling

Questions:

- Why does the rise of China matter?
- What does Wang Gungwu mean by the “culture of modernity”? What implications does “China’s fourth rise” have for the culture of modernity?
- What kind of change does the rise of China bring about to world politics?
- According to Gilpin, what is the difference between *international systemic change* and *international systems change*?
- What do you expect to take away from this course?

Readings:

- Christensen, Thomas J. 2016. *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. pp. 13-62.
- Wang Gungwu. 2004. “The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications,” *China: An International Journal*, 2:2, pp. 311-322.
- Katzenstein, Peter. 2009. “China’s Rise: Return, Rupture or Recombination?” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 15-18, New York, N.Y.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-49.
- Rosenau, James. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-20, 443-461.

Session 2

Contending Paradigms in World Politics

Memo Presentation II

What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

Francis Fukuyama, 1989

The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Samuel P. Huntington, 1993

...any ideological international order based on a universalistic ideology, such as liberalism or communism, is destined to have a short life span, mainly because of the domestic and global difficulties that arise when the unipole seeks to remake the world in its own image.

John J. Mearsheimer, 2019

Questions:

- Is the world embracing the “end of history” or the “clash of civilizations”? As of 2019, which of these two contending paradigms, or none of them, makes sense to you? Why?
- Does Fukuyama abandon his belief in the triumph of liberal democracy in his latest reflection on the “end of history”?
- According to Katzenstein, where is Huntington right about post-Cold War world politics? What is wrong with his “clash of civilizations” thesis?
- According to Mearsheimer, what went wrong with the liberal international order?
- What different policy implications do you draw from the four scholars?

Readings:

- **Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?”** *The National Interest*, Summer. Available at <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>.
- **Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?”** *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer), pp. 22-49.
- **Katzenstein, Peter. 2009. “A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations,”** Keynote speech delivered at the 2009 Beijing Forum, November 6, Peking University, Beijing.
- Ikenberry, John G. 2008. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” *Foreign Affairs*, 87:1 (January/February), pp.23-37.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2019. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” *International Security*, 43:4 (Spring), pp. 7-50.

Session 3

A World in the Image of *Tianxia*

Memo Presentation III

The Chinese, though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we shall destroy at our peril.

Bertrand Russell, 1922

The last 100 years have been a most trying time for the majority of Chinese wanting to keep faith with their culture of values. The transition has been long and bitter. The battle for a convergence between the old values that people are comfortable with and the new values that promise to free them from drudgery and poverty is likely to go on indefinitely.

Wang Gengwu, 2004

Questions:

- According to Zhao, what are the fundamental flaws of the modern international system? Does his *Tianxia* theory offer any better alternative? Why or why not?
- According to Kang, how and why does western IR theory get Asia wrong? Do you agree?
- Will Asia’s future return to its own past of the Sino-centric world, or replicate Europe’s past of conflicts and war, or remain under the American hegemonic domain, or unfold as something else?

- Where does China/Asia fit in the “end of history” vs. the “clash of civilizations” debate? Where is China headed in the 21st century?

Readings:

- **Zhao Tingyang. 2009. “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia),” *Diogenes* 221, pp. 5-18.**
- **Shih, Chi-yu, and Chiung Chiu Huang. 2017. “Relational Rules of Power and Their Intellectual Resources: The Chinese Case of Tianxia,” an unpublished manuscript presented at ISA.**
- **Kang, David C., and Xinru Ma. 2018. “Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 41:1, pp. 137-154.**
- Callahan, William A. 2008. “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony,” *International Studies Review*, 10, pp. 749-761.
- Kang, David C.. 2003. “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” *International Security*, 27:4 (Spring), pp. 57-85
- Babones, Salvatore. 2017. “American Tianxia: When Chinese Philosophy Meets American Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, Snapshot, June 22. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-22/american-tianxia>.
- Wang Gungwu. 2006. “Tianxia and Empire: External Chinese Perspectives,” Inaugural Tsai Lecture, Harvard University, May 4.
- Jacques, Martin. 2009. *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of A New Global Order*. New York: The Penguin Press.

TA Section 2

- Discuss the paradigm change in world politics

Session 4

China’s Quest for Modern Identity

Memo Presentation IV

China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a civilization pretending to be a state. The story of modern China could be described as the effort by both Chinese and foreigners to squeeze a civilization into the arbitrary, constraining framework of the modern state, an institutional invention that came out of the fragmentation of the West’s own civilization.

Lucian Pye (1990: 58)

An important, perhaps even dominant feature of Chinese national identity has been a preoccupation with creating and maintaining a strong centralized state.

Michael Hunt (1993: 62)

Questions:

- What is the central motif that was consistently manifest in the increasing *radicalization* of Chinese elites or “politically engaged intellectuals” – from self-strengthening campaign, to institutional reform, to the Republican revolution, and all the way to the socialist/communist revolution – in the late 19th century and early 20th century? What accounts for this radicalization?
- What is your understanding of the paradox that “to save China meant destroying important parts of it” (Hunt, 1993: 69)? How did radical revolutionaries in the early 20th century characterize the relationship between the state, society/people, and the outside world?

- Where do the intellectual trends in the late 20th century and early 21st century resemble those in the late 19th century and early 20th century, and where do they differ? What insights can be drawn from the Chinese critique of modernity?
- What is the impact of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy?

Readings:

- **Hunt, Michael H. 1993. “Chinese National Identities and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis,”** in L. Dittmer and S. Kim, eds., *China’s Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, pp. 62-79 (you may skip pp. 77-79).
- **Meissner, Werner. 2007. “China’s Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present,”** *China Perspectives*, 68 (November-December), pp. 1-19.
- **Weiss, Jessica Chen, and Allan Dafoe. 2016. “Authoritarian Audiences and Government Rhetoric in International Crises: Evidence from China,”** Working Paper, Cornell University and Yale University.
- Pye, Lucian W. 1990. “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,” *Foreign Affairs*, 69:4 (Fall), pp. 56-74.
- Chen Zhimin. 2005. “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14:42 (February), pp. 35-53.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 1997. “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s,” *The China Quarterly*, 152. (December), pp. 725-745.

Session 5

One China and the Taiwan Issue

Memo Presentation V

The Taiwan issue presents us with a case of Sinicization in which the identity and representation of China are constantly contested, negotiated, compromised, and redefined by competing forces in and outside of China corresponding to changed circumstances.

Xu Xin, 2012

While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack.

John Mearsheimer, 2014

Questions:

- What impacts has the modern concept of sovereignty had on China’s traditional “center-periphery” relations?
- To what extent do China’s traditional statecrafts of dealing with peripheries remain valid and viable?
- Why does Taiwan matter? What is at stake in Taiwan for Beijing, Taipei, and Washington?
- Why is the Taiwan issue so salient in China’s politics and external policy?
- What are the implications of Taiwan’s democratization and generational change for cross-Strait relations?
- What are the implications of China’s rise for the resolution of the Taiwan issue?

Readings:

- **Xu Xin. 2012. “One China, Two Worlds: Taiwan and China’s Quest for Identity and Security,”** in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Sinicization and the Rise of China*. London and New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 65-96.
- **Christensen, Thomas J. 2007. “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,”** Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference September 11, 2007 Annapolis.
- **Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. “Say Goodbye to Taiwan,”** *The National Interest*, March-April. Available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show>.
- Rigger, Shelly. 2008. “Rising Nationalists: The Next Generation of Leadership in Taiwan,” *NBR Analysis*, September. Available at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/02112012/NextGen_Leadership_Taiwan.pdf.
- Oksenberg, M. 2001. “The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 83-104.
- Christensen, Thomas. 1996. “Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing’s World-View,” *Foreign Affairs*, 75:5 (September/October), pp. 37-52.
- Tu Wei-ming. 2005. “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center,” *Daedalus*, 134:4 (Fall), pp. 145-167.

Session 6

China and Japan: The “History Issue” in East Asia

Memo Presentation VI

Ruling elites often make pernicious national myths for instrumental purposes, creating divergent historical memories of the same events in different countries. But they tend to exploit international history disputes only when they feel insecure domestically. Societal reactions to elite mythmaking, reflected in radicalized public opinion, can reinforce history disputes.

Yinan He (2007: 43)

[T]he politics of Japan’s war memories and its identity as an international actor are fraught precisely because both its “memories” and the moral status of its war actions are deeply contested domestically.

Stephanie Lawson and Seiko Tannake (2010: 408)

Questions:

- What is the “history issue” in China-Japan relations all about? Are historical memories always subject to political manipulation or more deeply embedded in society?
- How is the contestation over the “history problem” related to Japan’s quest for identity/normalcy in international relations? How is it related to geopolitics involving China, Japan and the United States?
- Why are Japan and China (and Korea) thus far incapable of reconciling their past as Germany and its European neighbors have done after World War II?
- Is a joint history textbook a constructive first step for reconciliation?

Readings:

- **He, Yinan (何忆南). 2007. “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006,”** *History and Memory*, 19:2 (Fall), pp. 43-74.

- **Kim, Ji Young. 2014. “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan,”** *Asian Perspective*, 38 (2014), pp. 31-60. Available Online through Cornell’s e-journals.
- **Lawson, Stephanie, and Seiko Tannaka. 2010. “War Memories and Japan’s ‘Normalization’ as an International Actor: A Critical Analysis,”** *European Journal of International Relations*, 17:3, pp. 405-428.
- **Chen, Wenfan. 2013. “The History Question in Sino-Japanese Relations,”** *Undergraduate Honors Theses*, Paper 609, College of William and Mary. Available at <https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/609>.
- **Vickers, Edward. 2007. “Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China,”** *Compare*, 37:3, pp. 365-383.

TA Section 3

- Discuss the history problem in East Asia

Session 7

China’s Rise as a Maritime Power Memo Presentation VII

The challenge China poses is primarily geographic – notwithstanding critical issues about debt, trade, and global warming. China’s emerging area of influence in Eurasia and Africa is growing, not in a nineteenth-century imperialistic sense but in a more subtle manner better suited to the era of globalization.

Robert D. Kaplan, 2010

The deterioration of China’s ties with many neighbors was not the product of a new policy or strategy toward the region. Instead, it has occurred because a stronger and more capable China has acted to defend what it believed to be important or vital interests being challenged by other states.

M. Taylor Fravel, 2014

Questions:

- What is at stake in the South China Sea for China and East Asia? To what extent is China’s approach to the South China Sea dispute part of its expanding maritime power and influence? How does the South China Sea dispute affect China’s relations with ASEAN?
- What are American interests in maritime Asia? How do you interpret the Obama Administration’s “rebalancing/pivot to Asia” posture?
- Will China’s rise as a maritime power challenge the U.S. hegemony? Can the geopolitical interests of the United States and China be reconciled or managed by peaceful means?

Readings:

- **Kaplan, Robert D. 2010. “The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?”** *Foreign Affairs*, 89:3 (May/June), pp. 22-41.
- **Chung, Chris P. C. 2016. “Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China’s Claim in the South China Sea, 1946-1974,”** *Modern China*, 42(1), pp. 38-72.
- **Fravel, M. Taylor. 2012. “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights,”** in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., *Cooperation from Strengths: China, the United States and the South China Sea*. Center for a New American Security, pp. 32-50.

- Swaine, Michael. 2013. “Chinese View Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” *Chinese Leadership Monitor*, No. 41, pp. 1-27.
- DeLisle, Jacques. 2016. “The South China Sea Arbitration Decision: China Fought the Law and the Law Won ... Or Did It?” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July. Available at <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/south-china-sea-arbitration-decision-china-fought-law-law-won/>.
- Fravel, M. Taylor, Jessica Chen Weiss, Peter Dutton, Orville Schell, Edward Friedman, Tom Nagorski. 2016. “The Future of the South China Sea,” *ChinaFile*, July 12. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/what-is-the-future-of-the-south-china-sea/>.
- Fravel, M. Taylor. 2014. “Things Fall Apart: Maritime Disputes and China’s Regional Diplomacy,” in Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, eds., *China’s Challenges* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Forthcoming).
- Fravel, M. Taylor. 2011. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33:3 (December), pp. 292-319.

Session 8

Chinese Soft Power: The Beijing Olympics and the Revival of Confucianism

Memo Presentation VIII

The wall that stands in China’s way to the world is thick. ... simply a sincere heart was not enough to ensure China’s smooth integration with the world.

Fu Ying, Chinese Ambassador to UK, 2008

Paradoxically, China’s engagement with the Olympic Games has exacerbated the communication gap between East and West.

*Wolfram Manzenreiter,
2010*

Questions:

- Does soft power really matter in international relations? Does one country’s soft power gain mean another country’s soft power loss? How does it relate to hard power?
- What did the Beijing Olympics mean to China and to the world? What image(s) does China try to project through mega-events such as Olympic Games? How has China’s self-image been perceived and received by the outside world?
- What does Manzenreiter mean by the “weak power” of China’s soft power?
- What do you think are major problems with China’s soft power? How can China overcome its image problem?
- Do you think Bell’s argument for a Confucian approach to Chinese soft power convincing? Why or why not?

Readings:

- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Wang Jisi. 2009. “Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for Chinese Soft Power,” *Harvard International Review*, Summer.
- Manzenreiter, Wolfram. 2010. “The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power,” *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 34 (I), pp. 29-48.
- Bell, Daniel A. 2009. “War, Peace, and China’s Soft Power: A Confucian Approach,” *Diogenes*, 56:1 (February), pp. 26-40.
- Li Mingjiang. 2008. “China Debates Soft Power,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, pp. 287-308.

- Bell, Daniel A. 2010. "Developing China's Soft Power," *International Herald Tribune*, September 24.

Session 9

The China Model Debate

Memo Presentation IX

China is 200-300 years away from a market economy. Our economy is still built on privilege rather than on rights and lacks the three elements of a market economy: freedom, property rights, and entrepreneurship.

Zhang Weiying, 2012

2012 might one day be seen as marking the end of the idea that electoral democracy is the only legitimate and effective system of political governance.

Eric Li, 2013

Questions:

- According to Fukuyama, why didn't China develop the rule of law and political accountability as Europe did?
- Do you find Eric Li's argument about the resilience of China's one-party rule based on adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy convincing? Or Yasheng Huang's argument for democracy more convincing?
- Do you think that Zhang Weiying's vision for the market economy can be reconciled with Wang Shaoguang's Socialism 3.0? If so, how? If not, why not?
- What insights may you draw from the China Model debate regarding non-Western countries' path to modernity?
- Does Confucianism offer an alternative to liberal democracy as Daniel Bell (2010) asserts?

Readings:

- **"The China Model: A Dialogue between Francis Fukuyama and Zhang Weiwei,"** *NPQ*, Fall 2011, pp. 40-67.
- **Chen, Lin, and Barry Naughton. 2017. "A Dynamic China Model: The Co-evolution of Economics and Politics in China,"** *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26:103, pp. 18-34.
- **Bell, Daniel A. 2010. "From Communism to Confucianism: China's Alternative to Liberal Democracy,"** *NPQ*, Spring, pp. 18-27.
- Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. *The Beijing Consensus*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre, pp. 1-25. Download free copy at: <http://joshuaramo.com/>.
- Pan Wei. 2007. "The Chinese Model of Development." Speech at the Foreign Policy Centre, October 11.
- Leonard, Mark. 2012. "What Does the New China Think?" in Leonard, Mark, ed., *China 3.0*. The European Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 9-25.
- *Authoritarianism vs. Democracy*
 - Eric X. Li. 2013. "The Life of the Party: The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China," *Foreign Affairs*, 92:1 (January/February), pp. 34-46.
 - Yasheng Huang. 2013. "Democratize or Die: Why China's Communists Face Reform or Revolution?" *Foreign Affairs*, 92:1 (January/February), pp. 47-54.
 - Bell, Daniel A., Timothy Garton Ash, Andrew J. Nathan, Taisu Zhang. 2015. "Is the China Model Better Than Democracy?" *Foreign Policy*, October 19. Available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/19/china-democracy-theory-communist-party-politics-model/>.
- *Market Economy vs. Socialism 3.0*

- Zhang Weiyang. 2012. “From Privilege to Rights,” in Leonard, Mark, ed., *China 3.0*. The European Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 54-59. (Adapted from Zhang Weiyang’s keynote speech at the twelfth Yabuli Conference of China Entrepreneurs, which was held in February 2012).
- Wang Shaoguang. 2012. “Chinese Socialism 3.0,” in Leonard, Mark, ed., *China 3.0*. The European Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 60-66. (Originally published in *Studies on Marxism*, February 2011).

TA Section 4

- Discuss the “China Model”
- Watch Eric Li, *A Tale of Two Political Systems* (May 2013). Available at http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_systems.html

Session 10

China and Globalization: “The Belt and Road Initiative”

Memo Presentation X

There was a time when China also had doubts about economic globalization, and was not sure whether it should join the World Trade Organization. But we came to the conclusion that integration into the global economy is a historical trend. To grow its economy, China must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global market. If one is always afraid of bracing the storm and exploring the new world, he will sooner or later get drowned in the ocean.

Xi Jinping, 2017

China needs to do something which can help it be recognized as a responsible member of the international economic community and maybe in the future be recognized as a responsible leader.

Jin Liqun, 2017

Questions:

- What is economic and political rationale behind China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) initiatives?
- What are risks and challenges for China to implement BRI?
- What are geopolitical implications of BRI?
- In the era of Globalization 3.0, is China willing and able to assume a world leadership by providing global public goods? Why or why not?
- Do the BRI (and AIIB) initiatives represent an alternative vision for world order?

Readings:

- Wang, Yong. 2016. “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy,” *Pacific Review*, 29:3, 455-463.
- Rolland, Nadège. 2017. “China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Underwhelming or Game-Changer?” *The Washington Quarterly*, 40:1, 127-142.
- Dollar, David. 2015. “China’s rise as a regional and global power: The AIIB and the ‘one belt, one road,’” *Horizons*, No. 4 (Summer), pp. 162-172. Available at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/china-regional-global-power-dollar>.
- Johnson, Christopher K. 2016. “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: A Practical Assessment of the Chinese Roadmap for China’s Global Resurgence,” *Report, CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies*, March.

- Tekdal, Veysel. 2018. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: at the crossroads of challenges and ambitions,” *The Pacific Review*, 31:3, pp. 373-390.
- Chen, Dingding. 2015. “One Belt, One Road, One Frenzied Debate,” *The Diplomat*, June 24. Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/one-belt-one-road-one-frenzied-debate/>.
- Jin Bei. 2017. “Economic Globalization 3.0 and the Concept of Interconnectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative,” *China Economist*, 12:2 (March-April), 2-20.

Session 11

China-U.S. Strategic Competition

Memo Presentation XII

China and the United States will not necessarily transcend the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry. But they owe it to themselves, and the world, to make an effort to do so.

Henry Kissinger, 2012

China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war – unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it.

Graham Allison, 2017

There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.

Xi Jinping, 2015

Questions:

- What challenges and opportunities has a rising China brought to the United States and U.S.-led international order?
- How can China as a rising, “nonwestern” power and the U.S. as an established, “western” power accommodate to each other in order to escape the “Thucydides Trap”?
- What is a sensible, effective, and sustainable approach to managing U.S.-China competition against the backdrop of changing and globalizing world politics?
- What do you expect U.S.-China relations will unfold in the next five years?

Readings:

- **Allison, Graham A. 2015. “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”** *The Atlantic*, September 24. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>.
- **Mearsheimer, John. 2014. “Can China Rise Peacefully?”** *The National Interest* (Excerpts from John Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. A new, updated edition. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.)
- **Bush, Richard C. and Ryan Hass. 2019. “The China debate is here to stay,”** *Brookings Institution*, March 4. Available at <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/04/the-china-debate-is-here-to-stay/>.
- Zheng Bijian (郑必坚). 2005. “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status.” *Foreign Affairs*, 84:5 (September/October).
- Bader, Jeffrey A. 2016. “How Xi Jinping Sees the World...and Why?” *Asia Working Group Paper 2*, (February), Brookings.

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Session 12

The Covid-19 Pandemic: Toward a Community with Shared Future?

Class discussion

The reality is the world will never be the same after the coronavirus.

Henry A. Kissinger, 2020

Question:

- How will the coronavirus pandemic change the world?

Readings:

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~ **The End of Class** ~