

PKU Summer School International

THE RISE OF CHINA AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

“中国崛起与世界变局”专题研讨课

~ Syllabus ~

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Peking University
Office Hours: By Appointment

TAs:
Classes:
Classroom:
TA Sections:
Course Platform:
[TBA]

Objective

This seminar course is intended for students to make sense of China's rise from a broad historical and theoretical perspective. It will examine major issues and topics concerning China's rise against the backdrop of changing world politics, and to engage in the academic discourse and policy debate about China's rise and its implications for world order in the 21st century, and vice versa, address how evolving world politics informs and influences rising China's strategy and practice – namely, the mutual interaction and constitution of rising China and the changing world.

The objective of this course is threefold: (1) providing a working knowledge of major issues concerning the rise of China; (2) familiarizing students with different perspectives on China's international relations; and (3) equipping students with analytical skills to make sense of the evolving situation and current affairs in world politics, with a focus on China's role and influence.

Students wishing to enroll in this course are expected to have basic knowledge of international relations and China's foreign policy.

Proceeding of the Course

Attendance and Participation

This course is formatted in combining lecture and seminar styles. Participation and discussion (including attending TA-led sections and class fieldtrips) constitute a central part in this course. Attendance is mandatory. Students are expected to complete all required readings prior to class meetings and to actively participate in class discussion. Absence without legitimate reasons will lead to deduction in scores for participation and discussion, and **3 *unexcused absences*** will lead to a student's failure in the course.

You are expected to read all assigned materials before class so you can engage actively in the discussions and derive full benefit from the course. To help you do this, you are required to submit **TWO short comments/questions on the assigned readings** to the course online site by 11:59 pm the

night before class (you can skip this a total of 4 times over the course of the semester without penalty). These are ungraded, but failure to do them or to demonstrate through your answers that you have done the reading will adversely affect your participation grade.

Memos and Presentations

The proceeding of the course will be based on students' presentation of the required texts related to the general themes and specific topics. Throughout the course, each student is expected to write **three short (1-page) memos** which briefly critique required texts and raise questions for a particular session. The students who prepare memos should circulate the memos to their group members before class, and each **make a 5-minute presentation in TA-section**, which is followed by discussion.

Group Presentation

Students are expected to form a small research group to work on **any Current Affairs topic** that is relevant to the themes and contents of this course and to make a 15-minute presentation (using ppt) in class. For each TA group, students may conduct two different group projects. Each group is expected to work together as a team on a topic of their choosing, making the best of assigned texts and any other available resources in Beijing. The presentation is given in the format of PPT slides in class for 15 minutes and followed by Q&A and class discussion.

Fieldtrips

The class will organize two fieldtrips, as part of course requirements: (1) One-day Tour to Tianjin, *Foreign Influence and Chinese Modernity (legacies and representations of foreign concessions)*, tentatively scheduled for Sunday, July 12; (2) Visit to the Marco Polo Bridge (卢沟桥) and the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (中国人民抗日战争纪念馆), tentatively scheduled for Friday, July 17.

Other optional tours: PKU History Museum; The Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan Park); The National Museum of China, the exhibition "*The Road of Rejuvenation*".

Paper Assignment

Students are required to write one analytical paper (about 1,200-1,500 words, double-space and 12-point font) on a topic that is relevant to the central theme of this course. The paper should focus on one or more specific issues/topics of this course and may be related to your group project or fieldtrips. Consult with the instructor and/or your TA about your topic by the end of the third week.

Paper does not require research on primary sources, but it should be associated with the assigned texts and other relevant literature. Lists all the literature that you use or cite in your paper. There are different systems of citations. You may choose one of the following two systems (of *The Chicago Manual of Style* Online):

- **Author-date** sample citations:
https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html;
- **Notes-Bibliography** sample citations:
https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html.

The paper is **due on Monday, August 10**. No late submission will be accepted unless a legitimate reason is presented to the instructor at least three days in advance. If you have any question concerning how to pick up a topic and/or how to write a paper, please consult with the instructor or TAs.

Evaluation

Five parts of the evaluation will be calculated as follows:

Attendance	Participation	Memo/Presentation	Group Presentation	Paper
15%	15%	24%	16%	30%

Texts

There are both *required* and *recommended* readings for each class. No book purchase needed. Yet you may read any of the following books as a background reading:

- Ezra F. Vogel. 2011. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge, MA and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- *Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World*. Interviews and Selections by Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill with Ali Wyne, Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger. MIT Press, 2012.
- Henry Kissinger. 2011. *On China*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Thomas J. Christensen. 2016. *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Mahbubani, Kishore. 2020. *Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy*. First edition. New York: Public Affairs.

All the required texts (those highlighted in **bold**) will be available and accessible through the course platform, which will be available during the summer school.

Academic Integrity

Participation in this class commits the students and instructor to abide by a general norm of equal opportunity and academic integrity. It implies permission from students to submit their written work to services that check for plagiarism (such as Turnitin.com). It is your responsibility to familiarize yourself with the definition of plagiarism. Violations of the norm of academic integrity will be firmly dealt with in this class.

CLASS SCHEDULE
(Subject to adjustment)

Session 1 (7/6)

Introduction: Understanding the Rise of China

China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.

Napoléon Bonaparte, 1803 (or 1817)

It is not possible to pretend that China is another player. This is the biggest player in the history of man.

Lee Kuan Yew, 1993

Outline

- What is the rise of China all about?
- International *systemic* change and international *systems* change
- The purpose and scope of the course
- Course requirements
- Class and presentations scheduling

Questions

- Why does the rise of China matter?
- What kind of change does the rise of China bring about to world politics?
- According to Gilpin, what is the difference between *international systemic change* and *international systems change*?
- What do you expect to take away from this course?

Readings

- Christensen, Thomas J. 2016. *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. pp. 13-62.
- Allison, Graham A. 2015. "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?" *The Atlantic*, September 24. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>.
- Economist. 2024. "China has become a scientific superpower," *The Economist*, June 12. From plant biology to superconductor physics the country is at the cutting edge.
- Lee Kuan Yew: *The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World*. Interviews and Selections by Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill with Ali Wyne, Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger. MIT Press, 2012. Chapter 1.
- Katzenstein, Peter. 2009. "China's Rise: Return, Rupture or Recombination?" Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 15-18, New York, N.Y.
- Lardy, Nicholas R. 2024. "China Is Still Rising: Don't Underestimate the World's Second-Biggest Economy," *Foreign Affairs Website*, April 2. Available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-still-rising>.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-49.

- Rosenau, J. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.3-20, 443-461.

Video

- *Secret Ingredient* (Kung Fu Panda, 2008). Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiE4UI5mfaA>.

Session 2 (7/7)

Contending Paradigms in World Politics

Memo Presentation I

What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

Francis Fukuyama, 1989

The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Samuel P. Huntington, 1993

Outline

- Paradigm shift in world politics
- The “end of history” vs. the “clash of civilizations”
- The East-West dichotomy
- Academic discourse and policy implications

Questions

- Is the world embracing the “end of history” or the “clash of civilizations”? As of 2025, which of these two contending paradigms, or none of them, makes sense to you? Why?
- Does Fukuyama abandon his belief in the triumph of liberal democracy in his latest reflection on the “end of history”?
- According to Katzenstein, where is Huntington right about post-Cold War world politics? What is wrong with his “clash of civilizations” thesis?
- What different policy implications do you draw from the four scholars?

Readings

- **Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?”** *The National Interest*, Summer. Available at <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>.
- **Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?”** *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer), pp. 22-49.
- **Katzenstein, Peter. 2009. “A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations,”** Keynote speech delivered at the 2009 Beijing Forum, November 6, Peking University, Beijing.
- Gillespie, Nick, interview with Francis Fukuyama. 2019. “Ideology Is Out Identity Is In,” *Reason*, January, pp. 47-54.
- Kagan, Robert. 2008. “The End of the End of History: Why the twenty-first century will look like the nineteenth,” *The New Republic*. April 23. Available at http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=ee167382-bd16-4b13-beb7-08effe1a6844.

- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993b. “If Not Civilizations, What?” Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December. Available Online through Cornell’s e-journals.
- Said, Edward W. 2001. “The Clash of Ignorance,” *The Nation*, October 22 Issue. Available at <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/clash-ignorance/>.
- Sen, Amartya. 2006. “What Clash of Civilizations? Why religious identity isn’t destiny,” *Slate*, March 29. Article URL: <http://www.slate.com/id/2138731/>.

Video

- Huntington vs. Fukuyama, C-Span, 10/20/1992

Session 3 (7/8)

Competing Visions for Power Transition

Memo Presentation II

...any ideological international order based on a universalistic ideology, such as liberalism or communism, is destined to have a short life span, mainly because of the domestic and global difficulties that arise when the unipole seeks to remake the world in its own image.

John J. Mearsheimer, 2019

A unique feature of Chinese leaders’ understanding of their country’s history is their persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats.

Wang Jisi 2011

Outline

- Between *systemic* change and *systems* change
- The Thucydides Trap vs. the Kindleberger Trap
- Domestic politics and geopolitical competition

Questions

- How has China defined its core national interests?
- What kind of change does the rise of China bring to world order?
- Do you find Mearsheimer’s argument that China cannot rise peacefully convincing? Why or why not?
- Can the liberal international system survive as China is rising to the status of a global power?

Readings

- Wang Jisi (王缉思). 2011. “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” *Foreign Affairs*, 90:2 (March/April), pp. 68-79.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2014. “Can China Rise Peacefully?” *The National Interest*, October 25. (Excerpts from John Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. A new, updated edition. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.) Available at <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204>.
- Pan, Chengxin. 2004. “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 29:3 (June-July), pp. 305-331.

- Buzan, Barry. 2010. “China in International Society: Is Peaceful Rise Possible?” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, pp. 5-36.
- Parmar, Inderjeet. 2018. “The US-led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?” *International Affairs*, 94:1, pp. 151-172.
- Zheng Bijian (郑必坚). 2005. “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status.” *Foreign Affairs*, 84:5 (September/October).
- Layne, Christopher Layne. 2018. “The US-Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” *International Affairs*, 94:1, pp. 89-111.
- Doshi, Rush. 2021. *The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ikenberry, John G. 2008. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” *Foreign Affairs*, 87:1 (January/February), pp.23-37.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2019. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” *International Security*, 43:4 (Spring), pp. 7-50.
- Kang, David. 2003. “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” *International Security*, 27:4 (Spring), pp. 57-85.
- Kang, David C. 2022. “Still Getting Asia Wrong: No ‘Contain China’ Coalition Exists,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 45:4, pp. 79-98.

Video

- *State Department Official on China Threat: For First Time the U.S. Has “Great Power Competitor That Is Not Caucasian,”* 4/29/2019. Available at <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x778gji>.

Concessions in Tianjin: Foreign Influence and Chinese Modernity

Pre-session | 7/10 9:00-11:00 AM

Fieldtrip I | Sunday, July 12

The concessions reveal an element of heterocronies, since they can be considered like museums but living ones.

Marinnelli, 2009



- Italy-style town (意风区) (former Italian concession)
- Liang Qichao Museum (梁启超纪念馆)

- Jingyuan (静园) – The Last Emperor Puyi Old Residence (former Japanese concession)
- Wudadao (五大道) (former British concession)
- Central Park (中心公园) (former French concession)
- St Joseph's Cathedral Church (西开教堂)
- Église Notre-Dame des Victoires (望海楼教堂)
- Tianjin ancient cultural street (古文化街)

Readings:

- Marinelli, Maurizio. 2024. “Tianjin: history, memory, and heritage in a hyper-colonial-globalising port-city,” *Built Heritage*, 8:49, pp. 1-4.
- Colville, Alex. 2020. “Liang Qichao and his failed China dream,” *Chinese Lives*, May 4. Available at <https://thechinaproject.com/2020/05/04/liang-qichao-and-his-failed-china-dream/>.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth G. 1980. *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952*. Stanford University Press.
- Marinelli, Maurizio. 2010. “Internal and External Spaces: The Emotional Capital of Tianjin’s Italian Concession,” *Emotion, Space and Society*, 3, pp. 62-70.
- Wei, Yehua Denis, and Yanjie Jia. 2003. “The Geographical Foundations of Local State Initiatives: Globalizing Tianjin, China,” *Cities*, 20:2, pp. 101-114.

Session 4 (7/13)

A World in the Image of *Tianxia*

Memo Presentation III

The Chinese, though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we shall destroy at our peril.

Bertrand Russell, 1922

The last 100 years have been a most trying time for the majority of Chinese wanting to keep faith with their culture of values. The transition has been long and bitter. The battle for a convergence between the old values that people are comfortable with and the new values that promise to free them from drudgery and poverty is likely to go on indefinitely.

Wang Gengwu, 2004

Outline

- China’s rise in a historical perspective
- Tianxia as an idea and practice
- The Sinic imperial/interstate system
- Asian values

Questions

- What does Wang Gungwu mean by the “culture of modernity”? What implications does “China’s fourth rise” have for the culture of modernity?
- According to Kang, how and why does western IR theory get Asia wrong? Do you agree?

- According to Zhao, what are the fundamental flaws of the modern international system? Does his *Tianxia* theory offer any better alternative? Why or why not?
- Will Asia's future return to its own past of the Sino-centric world, or replicate Europe's past of conflicts and war, or remain under the American hegemonic domain, or unfold as something else?
- Where does China/Asia fit in the "end of history" vs. the "clash of civilizations" debate? Where is China headed in the 21st century?

Readings

- Wang Gungwu. 2004. "The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications," *China: An International Journal*, 2:2, pp. 311-322.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 1994. "Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April.
- Zhao Tingyang. 2009. "A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)," *Diogenes* 221, pp. 5-18.
- Kang, David C. (康灿雄), and Xinru Ma (马心如). 2018. "Thucydides Didn't Live in East Asia," *The Washington Quarterly*, 41:1, pp. 137-154.
- Fairbank, J.K., ed. 1968. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp.1-19.
- Kang, D. 2003/04. "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," *International Security*, 28:3 (Winter), pp.165-180.
- Funabashi, Y. 1993. "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, 72:5 (November/December), pp.75-85.
- Acharya, A. 2003/04. "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" *International Security*, 28:3 (Winter), pp.149-164. Available Online through Cornell's e-journals.
- Shih, Chi-yu, and Chiung Chiu Huang. 2017. "Relational Rules of Power and Their Intellectual Resources: The Chinese Case of Tianxia," an unpublished manuscript presented at ISA.
- Callahan, William A. 2008. "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony," *International Studies Review*, 10, pp. 749-761.

Video

- Eric X. Li's interview with Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim, 2024.
<https://v.ifeng.com/c/8aTBGR4HPhL>.

Session 5 (7/14)

China's Quest for Modern Identity

Memo Presentation IV

China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a civilization pretending to be a state. The story of modern China could be described as the effort by both Chinese and foreigners to squeeze a civilization into the arbitrary, constraining framework of the modern state, an institutional invention that came out of the fragmentation of the West's own civilization.

Lucian Pye (1990: 58)

An important, perhaps even dominant feature of Chinese national identity has been a preoccupation with creating and maintaining a strong centralized state.

Michael Hunt (1993: 62)

Outline

- The rise of Chinese nationalism
- Duality of enlightenment and survival
- The century of humiliation
- The China dream

Questions

- What is the central motif that was consistently manifest in the increasing *radicalization* of Chinese elites or “politically engaged intellectuals” – from self-strengthening campaign, to institutional reform, to the Republican revolution, and all the way to the socialist/communist revolution – in the late 19th century and early 20th century? What accounts for this radicalization?
- What is your understanding of the paradox that “to save China meant destroying important parts of it” (Hunt, 1993: 69)? How did radical revolutionaries in the early 20th century characterize the relationship between the state, society/people, and the outside world?
- Where do the intellectual trends in the late 20th century and early 21st century resemble those in the late 19th century and early 20th century, and where do they differ? What insights can be drawn from the Chinese critique of modernity?
- What is the impact of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy?

Readings

- **Hunt, Michael H. 1993. “Chinese National Identities and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis,”** in L. Dittmer and S. Kim, eds., *China’s Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, pp. 62-79 (you may skip pp. 77-79).
- **Meinhof, Marius. 2018. “Contesting Chinese modernity? Postcoloniality and discourses on modernisation at a Chinese university campus,”** *Postcolonial Studies*, 21:4, pp. 469-484.
- **Yang, Z. 2022. “Sinophone Classicism: Chineseness as Temporal and Mnemonic Experience in the Digital Era,”** *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 1-15.
- Meissner, Werner. 2007. “China’s Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present,” *China Perspectives*, 68 (November-December), pp. 1-19.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 1997. “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s,” *The China Quarterly*, 152. (December), pp. 725-745.
- Chen Zhimin. 2005. “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14:42 (February), pp. 35-53.
- Weiss, Jessica Chen, and Allan Dafoe. 2016. “Authoritarian Audiences and Government Rhetoric in International Crises: Evidence from China,” Working Paper, Cornell University and Yale University.

Session 6 (7/15)

One China and the Taiwan Issue

Memo Presentation V

The Taiwan issue presents us with a case of Sinicization in which the identity and representation of China are constantly contested, negotiated, compromised, and redefined by competing forces in and outside of China corresponding to changed circumstances.

Xu Xin, 2012

While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack.

John Mearsheimer, 2014

Outline

- Taiwan's loss, return, and pending reunion
- One China principle
- U.S. strategic ambiguity
- Cross-Strait complex engagement

Questions

- What impacts has the modern concept of sovereignty had on China's traditional "center-periphery" relations?
- To what extent do China's traditional statecrafts of dealing with peripheries remain valid and viable?
- Why does Taiwan matter? What is at stake in Taiwan for Beijing, Taipei, and Washington?
- Why is the Taiwan issue so salient in China's politics and external policy?
- What are the implications of China's rise for the resolution of the Taiwan issue?

Readings

- **Xu Xin. 2012. "One China, Two Worlds: Taiwan and China's Quest for Identity and Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Sinicization and the Rise of China*. London and New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 65-96.**
- **Christensen, Thomas J. 2007. "A Strong and Moderate Taiwan," Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference September 11, 2007, Annapolis.**
- **Glaser, Bonnie E., Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen. 2023. "Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence: Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 88-100.**
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. "Say Goodbye to Taiwan," *The National Interest*, March-April. Available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show>.
- Blanchette, Jude & Hass, Ryan. 2023. "The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution," *Foreign Affairs*, 102:1 (January/February), pp. 102-114.
- Oksenberg, M. 2001. "The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.83-104.
- Rigger, Shelly. 2008. "Rising Nationalists: The Next Generation of Leadership in Taiwan," *NBR Analysis*, September. Available at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/02112012/NextGen_Leadership_Taiwan.pdf.

History Education in China

Fieldtrip II | Friday, 7/17

*Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression
at the Marco Polo Bridge (卢沟桥)*



Session 7 (7/20)

China and Japan: The History Issue in East Asia

Memo Presentation VI

Ruling elites often make pernicious national myths for instrumental purposes, creating divergent historical memories of the same events in different countries. But they tend to exploit international history disputes only when they feel insecure domestically. Societal reactions to elite mythmaking, reflected in radicalized public opinion, can reinforce history disputes.

Yinan He (2007: 43)

[T]he politics of Japan's war memories and its identity as an international actor are fraught precisely because both its "memories" and the moral status of its war actions are deeply contested domestically.

Stephanie Lawson and Seiko Tannake (2010: 408)

Outline

- Emotion, rationality, and empathy in international relations
- Patriotic education and popular narratives
- State legitimacy and national interests
- Historic justice and international reconciliation

Questions

- What is the "history issue" in China-Japan relations all about? Are historical memories always subject to political manipulation or more deeply embedded in society?
- How is the contestation over the "history problem" related to Japan's quest for identity/normalcy in international relations? How is it related to geopolitics involving China, Japan and the United States?
- Why are Japan and China (and Korea) thus far incapable of reconciling their past as Germany and its European neighbors have done after World War II?
- Is a joint history textbook a constructive first step for reconciliation?

Readings

- Vickers, Edward. 2007. “Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China,” *Compare*, 37:3, pp. 365-383.
- He, Yinan (何忆南). 2007. “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006,” *History and Memory*, 19:2 (Fall), pp. 43-74.
- Shih, Chih-yu (石之渝). 2011. “A Rising Unknown: Rediscovering China in Japan’s East Asia,” *The China Review*, 11:1 (Spring), pp. 1-26.
- Lawson, Stephanie, and Seiko Tannaka. 2010. “War Memories and Japan’s ‘Normalization’ as an International Actor: A Critical Analysis,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 17:3, pp. 405-428.
- Kristof, Nicholas D. 1998. “The Problem of Memory,” *Foreign Affairs*, 77:6.
- Whiting, Allen S. 1989. *China Eyes Japan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Yang, D. 2002. “Mirror for the Future or the History Card? Understanding the ‘History Problem’,” in Marie Soderberg, ed., *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the 21st Century*. The European Institute of Japanese Studies, pp.10-31.
- Wu, Xinbo. 2001. “Memory and Perception: The Chinese Thinking of Japan,” in G.W. Gong, ed., *Memory and History: Issues of Identity in International Relations*. pp.65-85.
- Okabe, T. 2001. “Historical Remembering and Forgetting in Sino-Japanese Relation,” in G.W. Gong, ed., *Memory and History: Issues of Identity in International Relations*.
- Kim, Ji Young. 2014. “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan,” *Asian Perspective*, 38 (2014), pp. 31-60. Available Online through Cornell’s e-journals.

Session 8 (7/21)

China’s Rise as a Maritime Power

Memo Presentation VII

The challenge China poses is primarily geographic – notwithstanding critical issues about debt, trade, and global warming. China’s emerging area of influence in Eurasia and Africa is growing, not in a nineteenth-century imperialistic sense but in a more subtle manner better suited to the era of globalization.

Robert D. Kaplan, 2010

The deterioration of China’s ties with many neighbors was not the product of a new policy or strategy toward the region. Instead, it has occurred because a stronger and more capable China has acted to defend what it believed to be important or vital interests being challenged by other states.

M. Taylor Fravel, 2014

Outline

- Maritime Asia in the Sinic system
- The norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity
- Managing maritime territorial disputes
- China-ASEAN mutual engagement

Questions

- What is at stake in the South China Sea for China and East Asia? To what extent is China's approach to the South China Sea dispute part of its expanding maritime power and influence? How does the South China Sea dispute affect China's relations with ASEAN?
- What are American interests in maritime Asia? How do you interpret the Obama Administration's "rebalancing/pivot to Asia" posture?
- Will China's rise as a maritime power challenge the U.S. hegemony? Can the geopolitical interests of the United States and China be reconciled or managed by peaceful means?

Readings

- Hamashita, Takeshi (滨下武志). 2001. "Changing Regions and China: Historical Perspectives," *China Report*, 37:3, pp. 333-351.
- Kaplan, Robert D. 2010. "The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?" *Foreign Affairs*, 89:3 (May/June), pp. 22-41.
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Session 9 (7/22)

Chinese Path to Modernization

Memo Presentation VIII

Contemporary China can only be understood in relation to its recent past. During the half century before 1950, Chinese history was marked both by the vigorous persistence of tradition and by the emergence of powerful revolutionary drives. With the final collapse of the imperial system, China sought meaningful values and effective institutions which could realistically link past, present, and future.

Mary C. Wright (芮玛丽), 1959

To be sure, China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But its success does show that many systems of political governance can work when they are congruent with a country's culture and history. The significance of China's success, then, is not that China provides the world with an alternative but that it demonstrates that successful alternatives exist.

Eric X. Li, 2013

Outline

- Chinese path to modernization
- The China Model debate
- Political development in terms of institutionalization and participation
- China's governance modernization

Questions

- According to Fukuyama, why didn't China develop the rule of law and political accountability as Europe did?
- Do you find Eric Li's argument about the resilience of China's one-party rule based on adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy convincing? Or Yasheng Huang's argument for democracy more convincing?
- Do you think that Zhang Weiying's vision for the market economy can be reconciled with Wang Shaoguang's Socialism 3.0? If so, how? If not, why not?
- What insights may you draw from the China Model debate regarding non-Western countries' path to modernity?
- Does Confucianism offer an alternative to liberal democracy as Daniel Bell (2010) asserts?

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Session 10 (7/24)

Chinese Soft Power: The Beijing Olympics and the Revival of Confucianism

Memo Presentation VIII

The wall that stands in China's way to the world is thick. ... simply a sincere heart was not enough to ensure China's smooth integration with the world.

Fu Ying, Chinese Ambassador to UK, 2008

Paradoxically, China's engagement with the Olympic Games has exacerbated the communication gap between East and West.

Wolfram Manzenreiter, 2010

Outline

- The concept of soft power
- Chinese Olympic dream
- The revival of Confucianism
- Reassuring the world

Questions

- Does soft power really matter in international relations? Does one country's soft power gain mean another country's soft power loss? How does it relate to hard power?
- What did the Beijing Olympics mean to China and to the world? What image(s) does China try to project through mega-events such as Olympic Games? How has China's self-image been perceived and received by the outside world?
- What does Manzenreiter mean by the "weak power" of China's soft power?
- What do you think are major problems with China's soft power? How can China overcome its image problem?
- Do you think Bell's argument for a Confucian approach to Chinese soft power convincing? Why or why not?

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Session 11 (7/27)

China and Globalization: “The Belt and Road Initiative”

Memo Presentation X

There was a time when China also had doubts about economic globalization, and was not sure whether it should join the World Trade Organization. But we came to the conclusion that integration into the global economy is a historical trend. To grow its economy, China must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global market. If one is always afraid of bracing the storm and exploring the new world, he will sooner or later get drowned in the ocean.

Xi Jinping, 2017

With these initiatives, Beijing, and particularly the CCP, seeks to reinforce the emerging global narrative that China is moving to the center of global economic activity, strength, and influence.

Christopher K. Johnson, 2016

China needs to do something which can help it be recognized as a responsible member of the international economic community and maybe in the future be recognized as a responsible leader.

Jin Liqun, 2017

Outline

- China’s embrace of globalization
- China in the middle
- BRI and driving forces
- China and the Global South

Questions

- What is economic and political rationale behind China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) initiatives?
- What are risks and challenges for China to implement BRI?
- What are geopolitical implications of BRI?
- In the era of Globalization 3.0, is China willing and able to assume a world leadership by providing global public goods? Why or why not?
- Do the BRI (and AIIB) initiatives represent an alternative vision for world order?

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Session 12 (7/28)

China-U.S. Strategic Contest

Memo Presentation XI

China and the United States will not necessarily transcend the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry. But they owe it to themselves, and the world, to make an effort to do so.

Henry Kissinger, 2012

China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war – unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it.

Graham Allison, 2017

There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.

Xi Jinping, 2015

Outline

- Structural constraints and strategic choices
- Managing strategic competition
- Mutual accommodations for peaceful coexistence?

Questions

- What challenges and opportunities has a rising China brought to the United States and U.S.-led international order?
- How can China as a rising, “nonwestern” power and the U.S. as an established, “western” power accommodate to each other and coexist peacefully in order to escape the “Thucydides Trap”?
- What is a sensible, effective, and sustainable approach to managing U.S.-China competition against the backdrop of changing and globalizing world politics?
- What do you expect U.S.-China relations will unfold in the next five years?

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Video

- An Interview with Kishore Mahbubani, interview in UAE, 2024.

Session 13 (7/29)

The World Ahead: Global Disorder vs. a Community with Shared Future

Memo Presentation XII

Outline

- Rising China in a bifurcating world
- A community with a shared future for mankind
- China’s Global Initiatives
- Four scenarios of China’s future trajectories

Questions

- What insight can be drawn from Haass’s “age of nonpolarity” for understanding China’s rise?
- In what sense does “a community with a shared future for mankind” resonate with the concept of Tianxia?
- Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the world ahead (next 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, etc.)? And why?
- What are your main takeaways from taking this course?

Readings

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Video

- "Geopolitics: An Unfolding Story." Speakers: Graham Allison, Monica Toft, Jin Keyu, Li Xueying, Happymon Jacob, June 26, 202508:30–09:30 CST (GMT+8). World Economic Forum. Available at <https://www.weforum.org/meetings/annual-meeting-of-the-new-champions-2025/sessions/geopolitics-an-unfolding-story/>.
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Session 14 (7/31)

Current Affairs in Your Eyes

[Group Presentation](#)

Each group gives a 15-minute presentation, followed by 5-minute Q&A.

Farewell lunch.

~ The End of Class ~